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JOHN NELSON WASHBURN*

Revelations of the
Lithuanian Defector Episode
of November 23, 1970'
Epitaph
Let's face it. Most Americans today are simply fed up with government at all levels. They will not-and should not-continue to tolerate the gap between promise and performance.
From President Richard M. Nixon's
State of the Union Address,
January 22, 1971
Presidential Perspective
President Nixon, when asked at his press conference of December 10,
1970 for his personal view of the incredible episode involving a Lithuanian
defector beaten on board a U.S. Coast Guard Cutter, replied:
Well, as I have already indicated, I was, as an American, outraged
and shocked that this could happen. I regret that the procedures of
the Coast Guard informing the State Department and the State Department informing the White House were not adequate to bring the
matter to my attention. I can assure you it will never happen again.
The United States of America for 190 years has had a proud tradition
*Mr. Washburn, formerly attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, 1958- 1966, and foreign affairs officer (consultant) to the Bureau of Educational
and Cultural Affairs of the Department, 1970-'1971, is currently a contract Russian language
interpreter for the Department's Language Services Division. He was educated at Dartmouth
College (B.A. 1946), Johns Hopkins' University School of Advanced International Studies
(M.A. 1947), Columbia University (Certificate of the Russian Institute 1949, Ph.D. 1970) and
University of Michigan (LL.B. 1957).
tThe opinions expressed in this article, which is based on the Report for 1970- 1971 of
the Committee on Regional Treaty Organizations, Section of International Law, American
Bar Association, of which he is Chairman, are his own.
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of providing opportunities for refugees and guaranteeing their safety,
and we are going to meet that tradition.'

Memoranda for the President
President Nixon's reply of December 10, 1970, placing the scandalous
Kudirka episode in perspective, emphasized certain procedural defects in
communications capable of correction and thereby preventing any similar
episode in the future. His reply was apparently based on information
presented to him in two memoranda on the subject: "Attempted Defection
by a Crew Member of the Sovetskaya Litva."
The first "Memorandum for the President" was submitted by the Secretary of Transportation and was dated December 2, 1970. At the outset it
was stated what the attached report covered:
The report reflects only the facts as we know them to be at this time based
on a preliminary review of written memoranda, messages, logs and telephone
conversations. A formal inquiry is now being conducted so that all facts and
circumstances can be fully developed. A complete
report, based on that
inquiry, will be submitted as soon as possible. 2
The second "Memorandum for the President" was submitted by the
Department of State over the signature of U. Alexis Johnson, Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and was dated December 6, 1970. Its scope
was reflected in these prefatory remarks:
In response to your requests, a thorough investigation has been carried out
with respect to the involvement of Department of State personnel in the case
of the member of the crew of the Soviet ship Sovetskaya Litva who attempted
to seek asylum on the Coast Guard Cutter Vigilant. There follows a detailed
report of the results of this investigation, which was carried out in consultation with the Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington and the Department of Transportation. However, it does not deal with the facts of the events
on board the two ships and in Boston except as reports thereon were received
by the Department of State. 3

International Law Aspects -Enclosure No. 12 and Departmental Inaction
This Department of State "Memorandum for the President" contained,
as Enclosure No. 12, "International Law Aspects of Attempted Defection
of Lithuanian Seaman at Martha's Vineyard," discussing the norms of
1

Press Conference No. 12 of the President of the United States, 7:00 P.M. EST, December 10, 1970. File copy of the Office of Press Relations, Room 2109, The Department of
State.2 p. 15.
The Secretary of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590. Memorandum for the President-Subject: Attempted Defection by a Crew Member of the Sovetskaya Lilva. Dec. 2,
1970. Title page.
3
Department of State, Washington. Memorandum for the President-Subject: Attempted
Defection by a Crew Member of the Sovetskaya Litva. Dec. 6, 1970. p. 1.
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international law with respect to fraudulent conduct as applied to the
Kudirka episode:
If, however, the cooperation of the United States Coast Guard was obtained by fraud, then the Soviet actions would constitute a breach of international law. In this connection it is noted, as the Commandant of the
Coast Guard has stated publicly, that "the Soviet Master alleged that the
defector had stolen $2,000 from the ship's fund." If the decision to deliver the
seaman to the Soviet ship was based on this allegation of theft, and such
allegation was false, then the Soviet authorities would be guilty4 of a violation
of international law, since their conduct would constitute fraud.
Missing from the discussion of the international-law aspects of this element
of fraud, was any reference to the sworn statement, describing the Soviet
allegation of theft as a "fabrication," which was made by the Commanding
Officer of the Vigilant November 30, 1970, and is quoted below in footnote
4. Apparently Commander Ralph W. Eustis had not actually perceived
fraud in the Soviet allegation of theft, before Kudirka was given up.
After Kudirka was given up, the Department of State was evidently
unwilling to use the conclusion reached by its own Office of the Legal
Adviser, as to the guilt of Soviet authorities for making a false allegation of
theft, to make possible the delivery of Kudirka to the Soviet ship. This,
along with the testimony supplied by Commander Eustis demonstrating
that there was no money among Kudirka's personal effects left with Eustis
before he was returned, could have supported a formal protest of a Soviet
violation of international law. When pressed obliquely on this point by
Representative John S. Monagan (D.- Connecticut), in Hearings before
the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, on
December 7, 1970, Mr. William B. Macomber, Jr., Deputy Undersecretary
for Administration, acted as if he had been unaware of Enclosure No. 12,
although its reputed author, Assistant Legal Adviser Charles N. Browner,
sat nearby:
MR. MONAGAN. Well, what, if anything, is being done now in the Government to bring about either a return of this man or a release of this man from

the captive situation that he is in at the present time?
MR. MACOMBER. The question comes up: why don't we protest more
formally and vigorously? And I must be very candid, it is very hard to protest

when the Soviet sailors, or officers, came over, at our invitation, picked this
41bid., Enclosure No. 12, p. 2. In the part of the Verbatim Record (See note 9 infra)
termed "Exhibits," in Board Exhibit No. 43, p. 3, was this statement: "At about 2030 hours, I
received a written note from the Soviets, advising me that a member of their crew had stolen
3,000 rubles from their captain that morning and requesting that I search the Vigilant and
return the man. Inasmuch as the defector gave me all his personal effects before he returned,
and there was no money at all among them, I sincerely believe that the story about the theft
was a fabrication."
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man up, with our permission, and carried him back, in one of our launches,
back to their boat. So we don't have very great grounds here for a protest.
I think the most effective thing that can be doneMR. MONAGAN. Well, I certainly don't agree with that. I think that the
knowledge of the situation that we have developed since the incident certainly showed that the original analysis on our part was wrong, and that this
man should be treated as in fact being a defector from the beginning.
MR. MACOMBER. Well, I was going to go on to what I thought was the real
answer to this, but there is certainly that problem, of our role in this.
Everything the Soviets did, they did with our permission.
MR. MONAGAN. Has any communication been made by any part of the
executive department asking for a return?
MR. MACOMBER. What we have done is expressed very, very clearly to the
Soviet Government our concern and regret over this incident, our very deep
concern.
But let me say that I think the best thing that we can do for Mr. Kudirka is
keep the world news media and all world opinion focused on what happens to
him. Let's find out what kind of a country the Soviet Union is. Let's find out
Have the press constantly asking them, "What have
how they treat people.
5
you done with him?"
World Public Opinion -Initial

Deception of Americans

It was not long before the approach advocated by Mr. Macomber as the
"best thing," with its rationale in effect justifying American Executive

Branch inaction, in officially seeking Kudirka's return by attributing to the
press of the Free World a potent future restorative power, was shown in
newspaper print to have been wishful thinking. The initial report from
American correspondents in Moscow, early in February 1971, based on
what were described as "reliable sources," made it appear that the Soviet
Government and the Communist Party were graciously overlooking Kudirka's treasonable conduct. Both The New York Times and The Washington Post so reported, the latter in a front page feature item under a headline
6
with no qualification as to source: "LithuanianDefector Is Living Well."
The Voluminous Untapped Government Documentation
7
Although there has been a Soviet blackout on information released

about the fate of the hapless Lithuanian, Kudirka, since the Coast Guard
5

HouSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 9 1ST CONG. 2D SEss. ATTEMPTED DEFECTION BY LITH-

UANIAN SEAMAN, SIMAs KUDIRKA. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on State Department
Organization and Foreign Operations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs at p. 21 (Dec. 7,
1970).
6

The Washington Post, February 12, 197 1, p. 1.Also, see the more cautious headline for

the same report: SOVIET SOURCES SAY LITHUANIAN BARRED BY THE U.S. IS
WELL,
7 The New York Times, Feb. 12, 1971, p. 8.

Despite the official blackout, reports about Kudirka's fate were later filed by American

journalists in Moscow during 1971. See, for example, dispatches of Bernard Gwertzman:
Lithuanian Barred by U.S. is Now Reported Jailed While Soviet Studies Treason Charge,
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 1

The Lithuanian Defector Episode
returned him to Soviet authorities while in United States territorial waters
off Martha's Vineyard on November 23, 1970, it is inexcusable that American lawyers and legal scholars, to say nothing of skeptical newspapermen,
have as yet failed to check the American record, in the form of government
documentation, with a view to improving on the distorted version of the
episode accepted throughout the United States. A study of the voluminous
documentation issued subsequent to the Presidential statement of December 10, 1970 (none of it branded with a ToP SECRET or any other classification), will demonstrate why the current version of the Kudirka episode
based on the initial, fragmentary claims is very inadequate.
On December 21, 1970, Secretary of Transportation John A. Volpe
issued the complete report, based on a formal inquiry, promised to President Nixon December 2. Secretary Volpe and Admiral Chester R. Bender,
Commandant of the Coast Guard, gave out under a press release, as a
single unit, the findings and related documentation concerning three Coast
Guard officers, suspected of possible violation of certain articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, in connection with the attempted defection of Lithuanian seaman Kudirka to the Coast Guard Cutter Vigilant.
The three items given out were: (1) the 77-page Report dated December
17, 1970, of the "Formal Board of Investigation into allegations of improper conduct in connection with recent defection attempt of Soviet crewman
to CGC Vigilant near Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, on 23 November 1970"; (2) the 5-page Memorandum dated December 18, 1970, entitled
"Action of the Convening Authority," in which the Formal Board of
Investigation's Report was reviewed by Commandant Bender, who had
convened the Board on November 30, 1970; and (3) the 1-page Memorandum dated December 21, 1970, entitled "Direction on your action on
the Formal Board of Investigation, Coast Guard Cutter Vigilant Case,"
constituting Secretary Volpe's final review and decision as addressed to the
Commandant, by which the two senior officers at Boston were allowed to
retire without court martial, and the junior officer in New Bedford was
transferred to new duties.
Not given out but referred to in the Volpe-Bender Press Release dated
December 21, 1970, was "The complete transcript of the proceedings of
the Board of Investigation," i.e. the basis of the Report to the Commandant by the Formal Board of Investigation. These Proceedings and this
Report, with the list of exhibits for both, together totaled, by my count, 908
numbered and 10 unnumbered pages. Collated in 4 volumes it was all made
The New York Times, March 10, 197 1; and Four Riga Jews Given Terms to Three Years,
The New York Times, May 28, 1971, p. 1. Also see the editorial A Treasonous Act, The
Evening Star, Washington, D.C., June 1, 197 1, p. A-8.
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available for inspection on December 21, 1970, at Coast Guard Headquarters in Room 8315 of the NASSIF Building, 400 Seventh Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. In addition to evidentiary material labeled "Exhibits,"
the verbatim records of the Board's Proceedings incorporated lengthy
proceedings held December 1-4 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and December 8- 10 in Washington, D.C. and also very brief proceedings held
December 16, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
The Coast Guard's Formal Board of Investigation
Twenty-eight witnesses, including four from the Department of State,
testified under oath before the one-member Formal Board of Investigation,
namely Vice Admiral Thomas R. Sargent, II1, appointed pursuant to the
Commandant's Order dated November 30, 1970.8 Admiral Sargent's remarks during these Proceedings served to clarify the investigative function
of this particular Board, which would not consider the interim reports to
President Nixon of December 2 and 6, 1970, but would develop its own
independent record based on sworn testimony and legal exhibits. Admiral
Sargent noted: "This is a board of investigation, it is not a court."-the
purpose of which is "to get all the facts down." 9 Later, on December 8, he
stated:
Furthermore, let the record show that my next statement is very unusual,
but I consider it completely necessary. The board takes notice of a vast
amount of publicity accorded to this case, and that the interim reports issued
by the President-to the President, by the Departments of State and Transporation, headlines in the newspapers, comments on radio and television,
have certain conclusions that have been drawn. Now, let the record show that
the board has not seen either of the reports to the President-referred to.
And, that the board asserts that whatever determination may be made, will be
made-will be based on the testimony before the board and the legal exhibits
enclosed. The board again asserts its impartiality and completely unbiased
and uninfluenced by the nonrecord material of the press. 10
The final paragraph in the Preliminary Statement of the Formal Board of
Investigation's Report defends the Board's findings against prior nonrecord press accounts of the Kudirka incident:
[5.] Some of the material discussed in the following report of investigation
8
According to this Order, appointing the Formal Board of Investigation, "Testimony of
witnesses shall be taken under oath and the proceedings shall be recorded verbatim."
9
Verbatim Record of the Proceedings Conducted at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters
Washington, D.C., 8- 10 December 1970, by VADM Thomas R. Sargent, 111, USCG, as
President of a Formal Board of Investigation Appointed by the Commandant United States
Coast Guard-To inquire into allegations of improper conduct in connection with the defection attempt of a Soviet crewman to USCGC Vigilant near Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, on 23 November 1970. p. 97.
0
" Verbatim Record... 8- 10 December 1970.... pp. 2-3.
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is in conflict with earlier accounts of the incident appearing in newspapers
and elsewhere, but it is felt that the instant report is authoritative."

This Formal Board of Investigation can certainly be faulted for its
failure to take testimony from the only Russian-speaking American official
present throughout the entire incident. As a fisheries expert primarily, and
as the Russian interpreter for the American side only incidentally, Alexis
Obolensky, National Marine Fisheries Service, Department of Commerce,
was uniquely qualified to testify. The fact that the Coast Guard assumed
incorrectly 12 that Obolensky represented the State Department rather than
the Commerce Department, may have been the reason why he was not
called by the Board. Despite this serious omission in its panel of witnesses,
the Board's Report of the Kudirka incident is unquestionably the most
authoritative one available.
Facts Discovered by the Board

The Formal Board of Investigation ferreted out many distressing facts
which, without prejudging the matter, should whet the appetite of all who
desire to understand better this scandalous Kudirka incident. For example,
Captain Wallace C. Dahlgren, Chief of Intelligence Staff for Admiral
Robert E. Hammond, Chief of Operations, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Admiral's choice to handle the possible defection attempt
reported from Boston, appeared at Coast Guard Headquarters Communications Center at approximately 1330 hours on November 23, 1970, to
pick up a double-headed message classified Secret originating from the
Vigilant, but was not given it inasmuch as he was "not on the cleared
list."13

Disclosed in testimony under oath, was the unimpressive role of the
Coast Guard Headquarters observer from Admiral Hammond's law enforcement staff on the U.S. Delegation to the Soviet-American talks on
alleged Soviet excess catch of yellow tail flounder. This representative of
the law enforcement unit under Captain Francis D. Heyward, was referred
to as Lt. Leo M. Moorehouse, Jr. (according to the U.S. Department of
Transportation Telephone Directory of October 1970, Lt. Leo A. Moore"Preliminary Statement dated December 17, 1970, from VADM Thomas R. Sargent,
111, 1670, USCG to Commandant, on the subject of the Formal Board of Investigation. This
Preliminary Statement constituted the first item in the 77-page Report of the Formal Board of

Investigation,
and consisted of 5 numbered paragraphs.
12
1bid., Paragraph 4. Alexis Obolensky did testify before the House Subcommittee on
December 18, 1970; for an appraisal, see House of Representatives. Attempted Defection by
Lithuanian
Seaman Simas Kudirka. p. 170.
3
' Verbatim Record ... 8- 10 December 1970.... p. 74.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 1

8

INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER

house, Jr.). He explained his mission and described his activities at these
talks:
Q. What was your mission?
A. Mainly just information purposes as a Headquarters representative. I
work in the Laws and Treaties Branch at Headquarters for Fisheries.
Q. Who is your boss at Headquarters?
A. Captain Heyward is chief of the division.
Q. What specific instructions did you get before this trip?
A. I didn't receive any instructions.
Q. To watch?
A. To watch. An observer mainly, to listen to the talks, to hear what was
said.
Q. I take it that you were not there to offer advice to anyone?
A. Yes, sir. I believe I was asked one question by the Russians during that
afternoon session, that was my only involvement.
Q. Were you there to give advice of any kind to CDR Eustis?
A. No, I don't believe so.
Q. Were you required to bring back a report to headquarters?
A. No, I didn't submit any report. Mainly orientation for myself at headquarters working with the fisheries laws.
Q. How long had you been at your job in headquarters?
A. I believe I reported on 28 August of this year.
Q. This 14was the first trip of this type?
A. Yes.
A Most Distressing Disclosure -Mooring Partner Unknown
Perhaps the most distressing situation disclosed in the Proceedings, was
an inexcusable error of mistaken identity of the Soviet vessel to which the
Coast Guard Cutter Vigilant was moored, port side, in Menemsha Bight on
November 23, 1970. According to Board Exhibit #22, which was the
Vigilant's Log for Monday, November 23, 1970, the entry for 1200 to
1600 hours began:
MOORED AS BEFORE, PORT SIDE TO SOVIET15 F/V ZAPRYBA
KALININGRAD IN POSITION 41 22.2'N 70 46.9'N.
In point of fact the Vigilant, a cutter of 210 feet and less than 1,000 tons,
was then moored, as it had been since 1030 hours, to the Sovetskaya Litva,
a mothership 500 feet in length and displacing more than 14,000 tons.
Shown a message from Vigilant the morning of November 23, describing
its mooring partner as the Kaliningrad,16 the Commanding Officer of the
Vigilant testified:
This name is the name of the vessel that we had received in our last
message from the Commandant that we were going to rendezvous with. I had
1aVerbatim Record ...1-4 December 1970.... pp. 199-200.
' 5 Board Exhibit #22-Cutter Vigilant Log, Monday, 23/11/70, p. 2.
"6Board Exhibit #9B-Telegraphic message sent 1058 hours.
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no reason
to believe the vessel I did in fact rendezvous with was not the same
17
vessel.

When Counsel for the Formal Board of Investigation then asked if this
Soviet vessel had a name on the stern, Commander Ralph W. Eustis
replied:
The Soviet vessel had its name on the stern and on the bridge wing,
however, it was in Gailicrs [sic] and initially no one made any effort to
translate it into English.TRs Later on we found we had a different vessel.' 8
"See Your Lawyer First"-Washington, D.C.
Did operational personnel of either the Coast Guard or the Department

of State, after becoming involved in the Kudirka episode on November 23,
1970, heed the admonition often emphasized by State Bar Associations, for

example, the Kansas Bar Association,-"See Your Lawyer First.?" The
Verbatim Record contains interesting testimony on this score. In the
course of cross examination, Admiral Hammond, the Coast Guard's Chief

of Operations, stated:
I'll tell you exactly, it never entered my mind to call our legal office. This I
realize was a mistake. I thought by going to the State Department we were
getting first hand knowledge and it just did not occur to me to call our legal
office. 19
And yet Admiral Hammond had declared earlier that, based on his experience in dealing with the Department of State, while serving in Alaska
as District Commander in the Seventeenth District, it was virtually impossible to obtain meaningful guidance from that Department on a timely
basis:
My exact thought was that while I was disappointed, I was not surprised.
We had many times -I served two years in Alaska, in which I had several
incidents with Russian fishermen, and I've spent all night trying to get a
decision out of State Department through Coast Guard Headquarters, and
been completely unsuccessful in every attempt .... 20
In another part of the city of Washington on November 23, 1970,
operational personnel of the Department of State had also been oblivious
to the benefits to be derived from in-house counsel. In testimony given by
17

Verbatim Record ... 1-4 December 1970.... pp. 221-222.
lbid., pp. 222- 223. In the original testimony the initials TRS (presumably Vice Admiral
T. R. Sargent in his capacity as the one-member Formal Board of Investigation) appear over
the words "gailic" and "english." Apparently he attempted to correct the spelling of the two
words by capitalizing the initial letter. In a record replete with typographical and other minor
errors, it is probably too much to expect a completely proper spelling of the word Gaelic,
much less a change to Cyrillic.
19
20Verbatim Record ... 8- 10 December 1970.... p. 58.
lbid., p. 36.
18
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Edward A. Mainland of the Soviet Union desk in the Bureau of European
Affairs, this exchange occurred:
Q. Was the Office of Legal Affairs contacted?
21
A. Well, in my hindsight, I know now they were not.
"See Your Lawyer First" -- Boston
Meanwhile, surprisingly enough, in Boston's John F. Kennedy Building,
the operational personnel of the First Coast Guard District had more than
adequate access to Coast Guard lawyers with offices there, and their
advice was in fact sought and given. Captain Fletcher W. Brown, Jr., Chief
of Staff of the First Coast Guard District, did discuss legal aspects of the
Kudirka episode as it developed during the afternoon of November 23,
1,970. According to District Legal Officer, Commander Jerome V. Flanagan, Captain Brown had the benefit of three separate discussions on legal
aspects of the Kudirka incident between 1330 and 1630 hours, the legal
advice being supplied by Commander Flanagan and his staff.2 2 However,
the First Coast Guard District Legal Officer did not contact Coast Guard
Headquarters for legal advice from his superiors:
Q. Did you have communications with the Commandant Legal people at
all?
A. No, I didn't call Commandant Legal at all. I thought that since the
message was double headed and sent to Headquarters Operations it would be
referred to Legal and that's why I expected a definite answer. I felt that Legal
in Headquarters and the State Department would come back with some kind
of response.

23

The Essence of the State Department Response to the Coast Guard
What actually was the response of the Department of State relayed to
Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington? Perhaps the most authoritative
answer was the one provided by Deputy Undersecretary for Administration William B. Macomber, Jr., the sole Department of State representative to appear as a witness before the House of Representatives Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations chaired by Wayne L. Hays (D.-Ohio), who directed the investigational Hearings in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building. Mr. Macomber succinctly characterized the Department of State's
contribution to the outcome of the Kudirka incident:
I regret very much that they had this man for seven and a half hours,
despite our request that we be kept informed of any developments, and
21

1bid., p. 242.

22

Verbatim Record ... 1-4 December 1970.... pp. 152- 156, at p. 156.

23

lbid., pp. 155- 156.
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despite an indication that we could give guidance as soon as we knew of those
2 4
developments.

When subsequently drawn out by Representative Monagan, Mr. Macomber amplified this description of his Department's possible future guidance
for the Coast Guard:
MR. MONAGAN. You said, I believe, that the Department in effect said,
"Don't do anything," to the Coast Guard, "until you hear from us."
MR. MACOMBER. Two things. Yes; we said, "Keep us informed, and we
will give you guidance, once the defection takes place."
MR. MONAGAN. Is that the same as "Don't do anything?"
MR. MACOMBER. No, we said, "Keep us informed, and we will give you
guidance, once the defection takes place, and we will give you guidance on
25
the basis of the facts then."

The Hays Subcommittee and Its Work -A Critique and a Recommendation

There were certain distressing revelations about the Kudirka incident
which were unearthed through the investigational Hearings on the incident
conducted by the Hays Subcommittee. It heard fifteen witnesses of which
six were from the Department of Transportation and the Coast Guard. But
by comparison with the revelations in the transcript of the Proceedings of
the Coast Guard's Formal Board of Investigation, the revelations contained in the Hays Subcommittee Report of February 4, 1971, together

with the Printed Hearings upon which this Report was based, were very
insignificant. Despite an inordinate amount of publicity given to the Hays

Subcommittee, on occasion Subcommittee members and even witnesses
before the Subcommittee failed to distinguish themselves by not having
done their homework thoroughly. For example, consider the "following
passage in the exchange between Mr. Macomber and Representative F.

Bradford Morse (R.- Massachusetts) before the Hays Subcommittee on
December 3, 1970:
MR. MACOMBER.

Well, what happened at the start was that the Coast

Guard, Captain Dahlgren of the Coast Guard called the one Coast Guard
officer at the State Department-he works in the Science Office-and asked
whom he should call. Dahlgren [sic] supplied him with the proper names.
MR. MORSE.

Right. 26

Had Representative Morse been better informed or more alert, he would
have said "Wrong," because this Coast Guard officer on duty at the State
Department was not Captain Dahlgren but Captain David A. Webb, and
the names supplied by Webb were not "the proper names," for the first
24

House of Representatives. Attempted Defection by Lithuanian Seaman Simas Kudirka.
p. 16.
25lbid.,
p. 21.
26
1bid., pp. 17- 18.
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man subsequently called by Dahigren was a man in the State Department's
Office of Security untutored in things Soviet. And for a glimpse of the
nature of some of Captain Webb's work in the State Department's Science
Office one must rely on the Proceedings of the Coast Guard's Formal
Board of Investigation:
Q. Do you do any liaison at all?
A. Practically none. I think Captain Dahlgren's call was the first,
no-about the third telephone call I had received from anybody in the Coast
Guard asking anything. I can't remember the others.
COUNSEL (LCDR FIDELL): Is your name in the Coast Guard Headquarters phone book?
WITNESS: No, sir.
COUNSEL (LCDR FIDELL): Are you found in any phone book accessible
as a Liaison Officer?
WITNESS: No.
COUNSEL (LCDR FIDELL): How then would you say that anyone could
find you as a Liaison Officer?
27
WITNESS: They would just have to know that I was over there.
According to the Report of the Hays Subcommittee:
The Coast Guard district office in Boston, Coast Guard Headquarters in
Washington, and the Department of State contributed in varying degrees to
this inglorious episode.28

This as a conclusion is good as far as it goes. But it glosses over the fact
that the mischievous bottle-neck in the Kudirka episode was Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington, a point established by Representative H. R.
Gross (R.-Iowa) during the Hays Subcommittee Hearings on December
29, 1970:
MR. GROSS. But neither of you gentlemen was in communication in any
way with the State Department either directly or indirectly. You had no
information as to its position with respect to this matter.
ADMIRAL ELLIS. That is right. Anything we would hear would come
through the Commandant. 29
It should be noted that the gentlemen referred to by Representative Gross
were Admiral William B. Ellis, Commander of the First Coast Guard
District, and Captain Fletcher W. Brown, Jr., his Chief of Staff, who
together with Commander Ralph W. Eustis, the Vigilant's Commanding
Officer, comprised the three New England-based officers specifically designated "parties to the investigation" in the third numbered paragraph of
27
Verbatim
28

Record... 8- 10 December 1970.... pp. 167, 180.

House of Representatives. Attempted Defection by Lithuanian Seaman Simas Kudirka.

Report of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations.
February 4, 1971. p. 1.
"House of Representatives. Attempted Defection by Lithuanian Seaman Simas Kudirka.
Hearings. p. 183.
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the Commandant's Order dated November 30, 1970, appointing the Formal Board of Investigation. Thus from the outset the focus of the search
for those with responsibility in the Kudirka matter was the Boston command post, and Washington was spared the ignominy.
Three Republican members of the Hays Subcommittee-F. Bradford
Morse of Massachusetts, William S. Mailliard of California and Vernon W.
Thomson of Wisconsin-jointly filed "Supplemental Views," which consisted of two sentences. 3 0 They agreed that Kudirka's attempted defection
had been outrageously handled, but jointly disassociated themselves from
those assertions in the Report tending to assess the motivation of Admiral
Ellis and Captain Brown, each of whom, they agreed, bore "a principal
measure of responsibility" on November 23, 1970.
Those filing "Supplemental Views" could have made a much greater
contribution to public and Congressional enlightenment, with respect to the
blunders committed in the Kudirka incident, by urging that the Subcommittee Hearings issued simultaneously with the Report, be supplemented
through publication of the most revealing documentation involved-the
unclassified Report of the Coast Guard's Formal Board of Investigation,
together with the transcript of all its Proceedings, nearly 920 pages in all.
Unfortunately, the ranking Republican member of the Hays Subcommittee was on record 3 l as not having read by December 29, 1970, the
testimony given by Admiral Ellis to the Coast Guard's Formal Board of
Investigation, and may well have been unaware of the content of the
testimony of witnesses of lesser rank due to pressures connected with
adjournment of the Congress. Nevertheless, despite the embarrassment of
past failures of omission and of commission, it is essential in my opinion
that this relatively inaccessible documentation be brought forcibly to the
attention of the American people as soon as possible. Unless this is done
promptly, the significance of the Kudirka episode in the conduct of American foreign policy, with its many legal and organizational ramifications,
could easily be substantially misunderstood and both President Nixon and
Secretary Volpe forced to eat crow in view of their assurances that this
would never happen again.
Hard Facts on Things Soviet:
State Department Guidance and Documentation in 1971
Whatever the guidance eventually provided by the Department of State
30
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to the Coast Guard, and whenever transmitted (the comprehensive, revised
"Procedures for the Handling of Requests for Political Asylum by Foreign
Nationals" to replace the "Summary Interim Procedures" were promised
in due course being "in preparation" back on December 6, 1970), responsible officials unaware of hard, useful facts will inevitably err and err
grievously. And the potential consequences of such erroneous decisions,
compounded by veritable torrents of publicity, are enormous. Probably, as
with fraud and deceit in American law and equity,3 2 fraud and deceit
Soviet-style can and should not be defined, each case being best resolved
by judgment on its own peculiar facts.
For those faced with foreign nationals like Kudirka from one of the
Baltic States-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania-such judgment should be
based on recent documentation, emanating from the Department of State:
(1) the letter dated January 27, 1971 from Secretary of State William P.
Rogers to Lithuanian Charg6 d'Affaires Joseph Kajeckas to commemorate
on February 16, 1971 the fifty-third anniversary of Lithuania's independence, which concluded with the statement:
The United States Government, by its continued non-recognition of the
forcible incorporation
of Lithuania, affirms its support for Lithuania's right of
33
self-determination.
(2) the three statements of two-sentences each as applied to entries for
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the latest annual edition of Treaties in
Force, released February 8, 197 1:
The United States has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Department
of State regards treaties
between the United States and those countries as
34
continuing in force
and (3) the letter dated May 7, 1971 from Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations David M. Abshire to Chairman Thomas E. Morgan of the
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, giving the Department's comments on House Concurrent Resolution 7, "Expressing the
sense of the Congress with respect to the incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and
stating:
The United States has never recognized the forcible incorporation of the
Baltic nations by the Soviet Union. Our attitude and actions have been
consistent with this policy, as is evidenced by our continued accreditation of
the diplomatic and consular representatives of the last free governments of
the Baltic states .... 35
32See Fraud and Deceit, 37 AM. JUR 2D § 1,pp. 17-21.
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The Vital Protocol Which Was Overlooked
Finally, from the standpoint of refugees in general, rather than those
from Lithuania or even the Baltic States taken as a whole, belated notice
must be taken of the most respected and widely applicable legal instrument
binding upon the United States-the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, done at New York, January 31, 1967, which entered into force
with respect to the United States, November 1, 1968.36 Although this
Protocol was a human rights document par excellence, constituting for
many of the refugees involved the difference between life and death, and
although the United States acceded to this Protocol during the year 1968
as Human Rights Year for the United States, neither accession as advised
by the United States Senate, nor accession as approved by the President,
nor deposit of the United States accession instrument with the United
Nations Secretary-General, nor proclamation thereof by the President
evoked any significant comment whatsoever in The New York Times. Only
U.S. Senator Claiborne Pell seemed to appreciate its importance0 7 Of
course, The New York Times partially redeemed itself by giving the Kudirka incident front page exposure on November 29, 1970 and thereby
rescued a story about Kudirka buried on the Obituaries page of the Boston
Evening Globe of November 25 which had somehow escaped the bureaucratic maw for State secrets.
Assurances by Secretary Rogers Deemed Premature
In sum, it is respectfully submitted that Secretary of State William P.
Rogers was premature when at his morning news conference on December
23, 1970, he concluded his remarks on the subject of the Lithuanian
defector incident with the sentence:
I think the public has been fully informed about it, and we have taken
whatever steps we think we can take to prevent a recurrence.3 8
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